Abstract-Some have suggested that housing policy, embodied by the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and affordable housing goals of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), caused the subprime crisis. We examine if these programs led to worse mortgage outcomes using two approaches. The first examines whether more activity by CRA-covered lenders, or more loan sales to the GSEs, was associated with worse outcomes. The second uses regression discontinuity to determine if outcomes were worse at the geographic thresholds used by each program. Our results suggest that neither program played a significant role in the subprime crisis.
I. Introduction
I NCREASED homeownership has been a stated goal of government policy in the United States for decades, and toward this end, several government initiatives have sought to enhance access to mortgage credit for low-and moderate-income households. Since the subprime crisis, however, some of these initiatives, as well as the broader goal of expanding homeownership, have come under criticism. In some cases, the critics have argued that government efforts to expand homeownership were also a major cause of the subprime crisis.
Most prominently, Peter Wallison, one of the ten members of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) established by Congress in 2009 to investigate the causes of the financial crisis, issued a 100-page dissent from the FCIC's majority report that identified government housing policy as the ''sine qua non of the financial crisis'' (Wallison, 2011, p. 2) . Wallison identifies two government programs as culprits: the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the affordable housing goals imposed on governmentsponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (which we refer to as the GSE goals). Others have echoed similar arguments about the role these programs played in the subprime crisis. 1 The CRA and GSE goals both attempt to expand access to credit for low-income borrowers and communities but use different mechanisms. The CRA establishes an affirmative obligation on the part of depository institutions to meet the credit needs of their communities, including lowerincome borrowers, and requires periodic assessments of each institution's performance in meeting this obligation.
Regulators use these assessments to assign ratings that are considered when reviewing applications for mergers or other activities, which provides an incentive to obtain a favorable CRA rating by lending in lower-income communities. Instead of providing incentives to lenders directly, the GSE goals attempt to expand credit in lower-income communities by increasing support for such lending in the secondary market where originated loans are sold. Specifically, the GSE goals require that a minimum share of loans purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac be loans to lower-income borrowers or involve properties in lowerincome communities. By increasing the available capital in the secondary market, it was hoped, the GSE goals would increase the availability of credit in these communities.
Critics argue that pressure to obtain a favorable CRA rating or to meet the demand from the GSEs for lower-income loans caused lenders to reduce their underwriting standards, which allowed some households to obtain credit for which they otherwise would not have qualified. Then, when these borrowers proved unable to afford their mortgage payments, the resulting defaults triggered the subprime crisis. Many of the studies that have made this argument, as well as the studies that have argued against this view, lack hard empirical evidence; instead, they point to a general association between the existence of the CRA and GSE goals and the overall increase in lending to lower-income borrowers and neighborhoods during the buildup to the crisis (Wallison, 2009; Liebowitz, 2009) . But by themselves, loan volume differences are insufficient to establish that the regulations contributed to elevated delinquency; instead, a link from regulation to loan performance is necessary, and here the evidence has been scant.
In this paper, we examine more rigorously whether there is a link between these programs and mortgage performance using two complementary empirical approaches. The first, which focuses primarily on the CRA, starts with the conjecture that if the CRA caused depository institutions to reduce their underwriting standards, then those tracts that were disproportionally served by CRA-covered lenders should have experienced worse outcomes. We test this conjecture by looking at the relationship between lending activity by CRA-covered lenders and loan outcomes in tracts that were eligible for CRA credit.
The second approach exploits the clearly delineated geographic rules used by the CRA and GSE goals. Both programs favor loans made to borrowers in tracts where the median family income is below established thresholds. If these regulations caused loans to be made in favored areas that would not have been made otherwise, then one might expect outcomes to be worse, all else equal, in favored areas. Using a regression discontinuity design, we test this conjecture in the region immediately surrounding the thresholds used by these programs, where each program's impact should be easiest to detect.
The remainder of the paper details our analyses and the results of our empirical tests. The next section provides background information about the CRA and the GSE goals and discusses the literature examining the relationship between these regulations and the subprime crisis. After describing our data in section III, we present the results from our two approaches in the following sections. Section VI discusses the conclusions we draw from our analysis.
II. Background

A. The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977
The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) was adopted to address concerns that limited access to credit, particularly in lower-income communities, was contributing to urban decay. Proponents of the law pointed to redlining, a practice in which lenders would deny credit to borrowers who lived in specific geographic areas, as a cause of the limited credit access. Moreover, concerns were raised that financial institutions were taking deposits in inner-city neighborhoods and lending the money in wealthier suburban areas. As a result, creditworthy borrowers in these communities were not being served, thereby reinforcing the deterioration of these neighborhoods (Canner, 1982) .
The CRA was meant to forestall this process by encouraging commercial banks and thrifts, which we refer to throughout this paper as depository institutions, to meet the credit needs of their local communities in a manner consistent with safe and sound operation.
2 Depository institutions are permitted to meet their communities' credit needs by either originating loans themselves or purchasing loans originated by other lenders. Other financial institutions, including independent mortgage banks and credit unions (which are omitted from our definition of depository institutions, despite the fact credit unions take deposits), are exempt from the CRA's requirements. Also excluded are affiliates of depository institutions; however, depository institutions can, at their own discretion, include in their own CRA assessments their affiliates' lending activities.
Each depository institution's record of meeting its community's credit needs is assessed by its federal supervisory agency. These assessments are made in geographic areas specified by the financial institution being examined, though they normally comprise the counties in which it has deposit-taking offices. Loans outside these assessment areas do not factor into these assessments. As a result, the CRA's requirements would have covered only the activities of depository institutions within their assessment areas. We refer to depository institutions lending, or purchasing loans, within their assessment areas as CRA-covered institutions.
Since the mid-1990s, compliance with the CRA has been evaluated using a series of numerical measures, including the share of loans originated by or purchased from other lenders in low-to moderate-income (LMI) census tracts or made to LMI borrowers. A census tract is designated as an LMI tract when its relative income-that is, the ratio of the median family in the tract at the last decennial census to the median family income of the surrounding area-is less than 80 percent. The surrounding area used for urban tracts is the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and for rural tracts, the state nonmetropolitan area. Borrowers are designed as LMI, regardless of the characteristics of their census tract, when their contemporaneous income is less than 80 percent of the median family income for the surrounding area, as estimated annually by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
Although the CRA covers many loan types, residential mortgage lending plays a prominent role in CRA assessments. In part, this reflects the public availability of loanlevel data on mortgage originations and purchases collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Loans reported under HMDA are typically used for these calculations, and analyses are restricted to loans within an institution's assessment area. Based on the examiner's evaluation, which often involves comparing an institution's lending and purchases with those of its peers, an institution is assigned a public CRA rating of ''outstanding,'' ''satisfactory,'' ''needs to improve,'' or ''substantial noncompliance,'' with most institutions receiving a ''satisfactory'' rating. These CRA ratings are considered by federal banking agencies when assessing an institution's application for a charter, deposit insurance, branch or other deposit facility, office relocation, merger, or acquisition.
B. The GSE Goals
Like the CRA, the affordable housing goals imposed on Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae as part of the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 (also called the 1992 GSE Act) were meant to increase credit availability in lower-income communities. This act, which among other things established the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight as the GSEs' safety and soundness regulator, required that a minimum percentage of loans purchased by the GSEs be to lower-income borrowers or backed by properties in lower-income communities. Specifically, three goals were established: loans to LMI borrowers, loans to underserved areas, and loans to special affordable populations.
These terms are defined using similar concepts as the CRA, though the exact definitions differ somewhat. In urban areas, LMI borrower is defined for GSE purposes as one whose income is below the median family income of the MSA (estimated, as above, by HUD). Census tracts are designated as underserved areas if their relative income is less than 90 percent. Tracts with relative incomes of up to 120 percent can also be considered underserved if more than 30 percent of the population in the tract is minority. Finally, special affordable populations are defined as borrowers who have incomes either below 60 percent of the MSA median or below 80 percent and reside in census tracts with relative incomes below 80 percent. Similar, but slightly more flexible, guidelines are applied to rural areas.
3
The numerical target levels for GSE lending goals are set in advance each year by the GSEs' regulator (originally HUD and now the Federal Housing Finance Agency). Before the subprime crisis, the targeted ratios for all three GSE goals were rising over time. In assessing the GSEs' performance in meeting these goals, nonconforming or jumbo loans (loans above a certain size), subprime loans, and governmentbacked loans (FHA and VA) are generally not considered.
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C. Framework and Literature Review
In thinking about how the CRA and GSE goals may have influenced the activities of mortgage lenders, one can imagine several distinct possibilities. First, the CRA and GSE goals may have had little or no effect on lending. Depositories may have adequately served the credit needs of their communities without undertaking special activities, and the GSEs may have met the affordable housing goals through their normal course of business. In this scenario, neither regulation would have altered the volume, pricing, or sources of credit in any area.
Second, CRA-covered institutions may have extended more credit in neighborhoods receiving greater weight in CRA performance evaluations, but accomplished this through enhanced staff training, greater community outreach and marketing, or similar activities and without changing the pricing of loans or underwriting standards. Such a response to the CRA would have altered the sources of mortgage credit in targeted areas (as banking institutions took market share from institutions not covered by the law), without resulting in a net change in lending activities at the market level. The GSE goals would have produced a similar effect if the GSEs were able to purchase more from goalrich sources without altering their underwriting standards or pricing. Again, one would expect a higher percentage of goal-satisfying loans to be purchased by the GSEs, with little or no impact on the amount of lending in a market.
Third, banking institutions may have responded to the CRA by offering financial incentives to borrowers from targeted neighborhoods (or sellers of mortgages from these areas) by reducing prices for credit (including transaction costs), easing credit standards, or undertaking more costly underwriting to identify applicants who were creditworthy but not obviously so. Similarly, the GSEs may have paid lenders more for qualifying loans or accepted loans they otherwise would not have to meet the affordable housing goals. These responses, as above, would have increased the share of lending accounted for by both CRA-covered institutions and the GSEs in communities favored by these regulations. If lenders responded by reducing interest rates or engaging in more costly and effective underwriting (without modifying existing credit standards), then the amount of credit extended would have increased, potentially raising home values and inducing borrowers to borrow more than they would otherwise. However, if lenders responded by lowering their credit standards, higher rates of default and foreclosure may have been the result.
Much of the literature on the CRA and GSE affordable housing goals has focused on the effect of the regulations on market share and loan volumes. For example, Avery, Calem, and Canner (2003) , the Joint Center for Housing Studies (2002), Bhutta and Canner (2009), Bhutta (2010) , and Hernandez-Murillo, Ghent, and Owyang (2012) examine how the CRA affects lending activity. Dahl, Evanoff, and Spivey (2010) look at how lending activity changes following CRA ratings changes, finding little evidence that a rating downgrade causes lenders to increase lending. The effects of the GSE goals on lending are examined by Ambrose and Thibodeau (2004) , Bostic and Gabriel (2006) , Bhutta (2008) , Rosenthal (2009), and Hernandez-Murillo et al. (2012) . Demonstrating that the regulations affected market share is insufficient to show a causal link between regulation and the subprime crisis.
5 It is also necessary to establish that the regulations affected the quality of loans that were underwritten.
Only a few studies have examined how these programs affected the quality of loans. Avery, Bostic, and Canner (2005) look at the impact of the CRA on bank profitability, but do so during a period in which there was little distress in the housing market. Bhutta and Canner (2009) compare mortgage delinquency rates across neighborhoods with differing income levels, though their analysis considers only subprime loans in private-label securities and is based on postal codes instead of the census tracts that the CRA used. Laderman and Reid (2009) compare the performance of loans originated in California by CRA-covered lenders with otherwise comparable loans made by others using a data set constructed by matching HMDA data (used to determine the lender) with performance information from Lender Processing Services (LPS). They find no evidence that CRAcovered loans were lower quality; indeed, they find that such loans performed better than non-CRA loans. While informative, because Laderman and Reid rely on a data set disproportionally comprising prime loans, their analysis largely excludes the subprime loans that accounted for a disproportionate share of delinquencies. They also do not examine the performance of loans that were purchased by CRA-covered lenders to meet their CRA obligations or the role of the GSE goals. Finally, Agarwal et al. (2012) find that loan approval and default rates at depository institutions were higher in the months immediately before and after a CRA exam than at other periods. However, these findings are disputed by Reid et al. (2013) , who argue that Agarwal et al.'s identification strategy is based on a flawed understanding of the CRA exam process and ignores critical institutional details, such as the importance of CRA assessment areas.
III. Data
The unit of analysis used in both empirical approaches is the census tract as defined by the 2000 Census. Regulators have used these tracts to evaluate compliance with the CRA and GSE goals since 2003. We restrict the sample of tracts to those that had a constant classification (i.e., GSE-goaland CRA-qualifying or not) over the eight years between 2001 and 2008. We further require tracts to have had at least three home purchase and three refinance loans originated in each year according to the HMDA data. Because HMDA reporting is less comprehensive in rural areas, we limit the sample to tracts in counties that were part of MSAs for the entire period.
Both empirical approaches compare lending outcomes across tracts. Our primary outcome measure is the mortgage delinquency rate in each census tract at the end of 2008. The delinquency rate is defined as the share of consumers with one or more mortgages at the end of 2008 who were 90 or more days past due on at least one of these loans. These tract-level delinquency rates were calculated using the entirety of the credit records maintained by Equifax, one of the three national credit bureaus. 6 Since the reporting of mortgage information is almost universal in the United States, the credit bureaus provide the most comprehensive source of information available about mortgage delinquencies.
While we would expect delinquency rates to provide the best evidence of an effect of the CRA or GSE goals, we also use variables reflecting high-risk lending activity during the height of the subprime market in 2004 to 2006 as outcome measures. If the CRA or GSE goals caused riskier loans to be made and these loans had not gone delinquent by the end of 2008, or if the increase in high-risk lending was not large enough to be easily detectable in the tractlevel delinquency rate, we might find evidence of an effect of the CRA or GSE goals on these outcomes measures even absent an effect on the 2008 delinquency rate.
High-risk lending activity is measured in each tract using the HMDA data, which provides loan-level information about the mortgages that covered lenders originate themselves or purchase from other lenders. We focus on two measures of high-risk lending during 2004 to 2006. The first is the share of loans with estimated monthly mortgage payments exceeding 30 percent of the borrower's income (% High PTI), a payment-to-income ratio that is generally considered marginal in underwriting. The second is the share of loans reported as higher priced in HMDA (% Higher Priced), which is a proxy for subprime lending activity (Avery, Brevoort, & Canner, 2007) . Higher values for either of these variables indicate more high-risk lending in the years leading up to the subprime crisis.
The HMDA data are also used to calculate the market shares of different institution types. For each origination and purchase recorded in the HMDA data, we determine which of six institution types originated or purchased the loan. The six institution types are depository institutions outside their assessment areas, depository institutions within their assessment areas, affiliates of depository institutions outside the depository's assessment areas, affiliates of depository institutions within the depository's assessment area, credit unions, and independent mortgage banks. Once the institution type has been determined, we calculate the number of loans originated by each institution type as a share of all originations in the tract. We also calculate the number of loan purchases by each institution type and the number of loans that were sold to the GSEs, both as a share of all loan originations in the tract.
These share-of-lending and purchases-as-a-share-of-lending variables are calculated for the height of the subprime market in 2004 to 2006 and for 2001, which was before most of the loans that went delinquent during the subprime crisis were originated. We primarily use these variables as regressors in our first empirical approach. However, since market shares in 2004 to 2006 would likely be highly endogenous regressors in estimations using measures of highrisk lending during this same period as the dependent variable, we use only these variables calculated for 2001 in such estimations. In addition, our second empirical approach uses some of these market shares to evaluate whether the CRA or GSE goals increased the share of loans originated by CRA-covered lenders or sold to the GSEs.
Both empirical approaches use a common set of baseline controls, which are listed in table 1. These controls reflect tract-level characteristics that might be related to loan out-comes, such as the median tract income and house value. In addition to the baseline controls, we also use a set of expanded controls in some specifications that reflect the types of loans originated during 2004 to 2006. The expanded controls include the share of loans that were underwritten without borrower income information (% No Income), the share of loans to low-to moderate-income borrowers (% LMI), and the share of loans to borrowers with incomes below the median income in their MSA (% Below Median Income).
The expanded controls also include the share of first-lien loans that were simultaneously originated with a junior-lien loan, commonly called a piggyback (% Piggyback). In some cases, financing a home by taking out two loans instead of one was cheaper. For example, borrowers who were not making 20 percent down payments could use piggybacks to avoid purchasing private mortgage insurance, which is required on mortgages with loan-to-value ratios above 80 percent. By taking out a first lien for 80 percent of the home value and a piggyback for the rest of what they wished to borrow, borrowers could avoid purchasing mortgage insurance and lower their financing costs. Piggyback loans became more common during 2004 to 2006 and were associated with higher delinquency rates during the subprime crisis (Eriksen, Kau, & Keenan, 2013; LaCour-Little, Calhoun, & Yu, 2011; Mayer, Pence, & Sherlund, 2009) .
Finally, the expanded controls also include the two measures of high-risk lending during 2004 to 2006 that we use as outcome measures: the share of loans with a high payment-to-income ratio (% High PTI) and the share of loans that were higher priced (% Higher Priced). Like the other expanded controls, these variables reflect borrower and loan characteristics that should have affected subsequent delin- quency rates. To the extent that these variables are independent of any effects of the CRA and GSE goals, including these controls should explain more of the variation in mortgage delinquency across tracts and increase the accuracy of our tests. However, if the CRA or GSE goals caused lenders to originate more loans with these characteristics (e.g., by approving more applications with high payment-to-income ratios), then controlling for such lending might understate the effect of these programs on 2008 delinquency rates. Therefore, in estimations that use the 2008 delinquency rate as the outcome measure, we present results with and without the expanded controls to evaluate whether either specification indicates a CRA or GSE goal effect. We do not, however, use any of the expanded controls as regressors in estimations where high-risk lending activity in 2004 to 2006 is the outcome measures. Since all of the expanded controls represent borrower or loan characteristics that are associated with riskier lending during this same period, the expanded controls (like the institution-type market shares for 2004 to 2006) would likely be highly endogenous regressors; as a result, we use only the baseline controls in these estimations.
IV. Approach 1: Variation by Lender Type
Our first empirical approach examines variation in lending activity within the census tracts that were favored by the CRA. Census tracts differ in the composition of lenders that have historically operated within the tract, and these differences tend to persist over time. In part, this persistence reflects the infrastructure necessary for loan origination, such as brick-and-mortar office networks or established relationships with mortgage brokers. Because the CRA affects only some institutions, this provides a quasi-natural experiment. If the CRA caused depository institutions to reduce their underwriting standards, then outcomes should have been worse in tracts disproportionally served by CRAcovered institutions. We test this conjecture by examining the relationship between loan outcomes and the market share of CRA-covered lenders.
A similar exercise can be conducted for the GSE goals. If the GSE goals incentivized lenders to make unsafe loans, then tracts with more loan sales to the GSEs should have experienced worse outcomes. However, this is likely a weaker test of the GSE goals for two reasons. First, the historical legacies that we expect are important in loan origination are likely much less important in the secondary market where the GSEs purchase loans. Second, if the GSEs met the affordable housing goals by purchasing private-label, subprime mortgage-backed securities, the marginal loans made to satisfy this demand would not be reflected in loan sales from lenders to the GSEs. For these reasons, though we present the results of our analyses using loan sales to the GSEs, we believe that this is a weaker test of the GSE goals and focus on the CRA.
Using ordinary least squares, we estimate a model of loan outcomes in tract i as
The right-hand side includes an MSA-level fixed effect, a M , and a vector of control variables, X t i , that includes the baseline controls and, in some cases (when using the delinquency rate from 2008 as the outcome measure), the expanded controls, which characterize lending activity from 2004 to 2006. L t i is a vector containing the share of loans originated by the six institution types, with independent mortgage companies serving as the omitted group. P t i is a vector providing the share of loans purchased by the six institution types, as well as the share of loans sold to the GSEs. If the CRA caused lenders to lower their underwriting standards, we would expect positive coefficients (reflecting worse outcomes) on the lending or purchase variables for depository institutions, or their affiliates, within their assessment areas. A positive coefficient on the variable measuring loan sales to the GSEs would suggest that the affordable housing goals contributed to worse outcomes.
The estimation results are provided in table 2. The first three columns show the estimation results for our primary outcome measure, the delinquency rate The results of these estimations suggest that tracts with a larger share of within-assessment-area lending by depository institutions, or their affiliates (at the expense of lending by the omitted group, independent mortgage banks), experienced lower delinquency rates in 2008 and less risky lending activity during 2004 to 2006 than similar tracts with less CRA-covered lending. Moreover, a comparison of the impact of within-and out-of-assessment-area lending by depository institutions and their affiliates (the coefficients in the first four rows of the table) also supports the view that CRA lending is associated with better, not worse, loan quality. In all but two cases, the within-assessment-area coefficient is more negative than the comparable out-of-assessment-area coefficient, although the difference is generally not statistically significant. In the remaining two cases, the difference is statistically insignificant in one case and has a small magnitude in the other. These results provide little evidence that the CRA was associated with worse outcomes.
The evidence regarding the share of loans purchased by depository institutions within their assessment areas is more mixed. Within-assessment-area purchases by CRA-covered institutions are positively associated with 2008 delinquency rates when the share-of-lending variables reflect 2001 activity, as in column 1. A similar positive relationship is exhibited in columns 4 and 5 for the high-risk lending measures. The magnitudes of these effects, however, are quite small. For example, since within-assessment-area purchases by depository institutions represented only 3 percent of loan originations on average during 2001, loan purchases by CRA-covered institutions increased delinquency rates by 0.12 percentage points on average. Moreover, when the share-of-lending variables reflect 2004 to 2006 lending activity (a period when loan purchases as a share of originations were about two-thirds higher than in 2001), the relationship between depository purchases and delinquency becomes negative. This suggests that CRA-covered lenders shifted their within-assessment-area purchases toward less risky census tracts during the middle of the decade, which appears inconsistent with the CRA having induced depository institutions to purchase riskier loans during the run-up to the subprime crisis. Purchases by the GSEs generally had little association with delinquency rates, though they do appear to have been positively associated with the share of high payment-to-income-ratio lending and negatively associated with the share of higher-priced lending.
Supplementary analyses (available from the authors on request) suggest that these results are robust to a wider array of outcome measures than shown here, as well as to examinations that are targeted to specific geographic areas (e.g., the ''sand states'' of Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada that were hit particularly hard by the problems that developed in the housing market) or to depository institutions with particular CRA ratings. In no instance does the CRA or GSE goals show the consistently worse loan outcomes that would be expected if one or both of these programs were important factors in the subprime crisis.
V. Approach 2: Regression Discontinuity
Our second empirical approach uses a regression discontinuity design to compare outcomes in census tracts that were eligible for CRA or GSE goal credit with outcomes in ineligible tracts, paying particular attention to tracts at the boundaries of eligibility where a regulatory effect should be easiest to detect.
To get a sense of the potential impact of the eligibility thresholds based on the relative income of the census tract, figure 1 shows the relationship between tract income and Virtually all of the variables show a significant relationship with relative tract income. Our primary outcome measure, the 2008 delinquency rate, and both measures of risky lending activity, the share of loans that were originated with a high PTI ratio or that were higher priced, all decrease with tract income. These general associations suggest why these FIGURE 1.-OUTCOME MEASURES AROUND CRA AND GSE THRESHOLDS programs may have been raised as causes of the subprime crisis: both regulations favor lending in communities that experienced worse loan outcomes. However, figures 1d and 1e suggest that there may be more going on. Both the share of loans sold to the GSEs and the market share of CRAcovered lenders in their assessment areas are upward-sloping in tract income, a relationship that would not be expected if the CRA and GSE regulations were driving forces. The one series that exhibits a discontinuity is the share of loans purchased by CRA-covered lenders within their assessment areas, figure 1f. This share falls significantly at 80 percent, the relative income level at which a tract no longer receives favorable treatment under the CRA. The other variables in figure 1 appear to be monotonic in relative income with no evidence of a discontinuity around either threshold.
In the remainder of this section, we test for regulatory threshold effects more formally. Our analysis focuses on three different thresholds: (a) the 80 percent relative income threshold for the CRA, (b) the 90 percent relative income threshold for tracts with minority population shares of 30 percent or less for the GSE goals, and (c) the 30 percent minority share threshold of the GSE goals for tracts with relative incomes of between 90 and 120 percent. For each of the three thresholds we examine, we restrict the sample to tracts around the threshold (plus or minus 5 percentage points). Census tract income levels, or minority percentage levels for the GSE middle-income threshold, are expressed as dummy indicator variables for each percentage point. The indicator variable representation gives the least restrictive picture of the role of the threshold. Because relative tract income is related to the outcome variables (as shown in figure 1), we would expect to see an implied slope in the coefficients on the indicator variables. Consequently, we transform the indicator variables to represent first differences rather than levels and order them so that the coefficients will be positive (we assume that the outcome variables are downward sloping in income and upward sloping in minority share).
Thus transformed, the indicator variable coefficients can be interpreted as the first difference (or income slope) at each relative income (or minority share) percentage point. If the regulations matter, we would expect a larger shift at the threshold than at other relative income levels. We test for such a shift by separately testing whether the first difference at the threshold differs from the first difference on either side of the threshold (narrow linearity) or across the entire ten percentage point range of income or minority share used in our regression samples (broad linearity). Table 3 presents the results for the CRA threshold from six specifications. Columns 1 and 2 test for discontinuities in the 2008 delinquency rate with and without the expanded controls. Columns 3 and 4 test for a discontinuity at the CRA threshold in our two measures of high-risk lending during 2004 to 2006, and columns 5 and 6 test for a discontinuity in lending or purchasing activity at depository institutions operating within their assessment areas in 2004 to 2006. As discussed earlier, we exclude the expanded controls from the estimations reported in columns 3 to 6 because they would likely be highly endogenous regressors.
The key coefficients are in the fifth row, designated ''threshold.'' A significant regulatory effect should produce coefficients that are positive and significantly larger than those in the rows above and below them. For the two estimations using our primary outcome measure, the 2008 delinquency rate, the coefficients on the threshold effect are negative. Not surprisingly, formal tests of narrow and broad linearity are consistent with the hypothesis that there is no discontinuity at the threshold. Similarly, the two measures of high-risk lending also exhibit no sign of a discontinuity at the CRA threshold.
The only dependent variable that exhibits a discontinuity is the share of loans purchased by depositories within their assessment areas during 2004 to 2006. Here there is a clear discontinuity at the CRA threshold that is highly significant in both our tests, suggesting that CRA concerns played a role in the purchase decisions of covered lenders.
8 However, no discontinuity is observed for loan purchases made by CRA-covered lenders in 2001, the period for which we earlier found a relationship between purchases and higher delinquency rates. 9 This suggests that the effect of CRA on loan purchases emerged during the height of the subprime boom when the secondary market was significantly larger. The fact that we do not observe a discontinuity in delinquency rates or in our measures of high-risk lending (and that we did not earlier observe a relationship between purchases during this period and worse loan outcomes) suggests that the increased purchases by depositories within their assessment areas did not have a measurable effect on the quality of the loans originated or their subsequent performance.
Results for the GSE thresholds are shown in tables 4 and 5. Again the key coefficients are those in the fifth row designated as ''threshold.'' All of the coefficients, with one exception, show either the wrong sign or are smaller in magnitude than other coefficients. The exception is the GSE income threshold delinquency equation with the expanded controls. Here the threshold coefficient is positive and the narrow linearity test mildly rejects the assumption of no discontinuity. The hypothesis of the absence of a discontinuity cannot be rejected for the broader linearity test, however, and both the narrow and broad linearity tests cannot be rejected for the delinquency equation with the baseline controls.
In sum, the threshold results show no evidence of a discontinuity at the margin for any of the outcome measures except for loan purchases by depository institutions at the CRA threshold. Indeed, most of the threshold ''jumps'' are 8 When the data are restricted to purchases by outstanding-rated depositories, the purchase effect becomes more muted (it is more pronounced when restricted to purchases by satisfactory-rated depositories). Purchases by depository affiliates and subsidiaries do not exhibit a discontinuity.
either the opposite sign of what we would have expected or not statistically different from 0. Formal tests and splits by geographic region are consistent with the same conclusion.
VI. Conclusion
It is not hard to see why some have suggested that the CRA and GSE goals caused the subprime crisis. Both regulations encourage lending to borrowers in lower-income census tracts, which experienced a disproportionate share of high-risk lending during the height of the subprime market and higher subsequent delinquency rates. However, a more nuanced examination of the data, as conducted in this paper, suggests that this superficial association may be misleading. Using a variety of indirect tests, we find little evidence to support the view that either the CRA or the GSE goals resulted in worse loan outcomes.
It would be inappropriate, however, to conclude from our analysis that the CRA and GSE goals played no role in the subprime crisis. The existence of loans originated through special CRA programs and targeted affordable loans in the GSE portfolios suggest that both regulations led some loans to be underwritten with different prices or terms than otherwise would have been the case. But such loans were a small portion of lending activity under these two programs, and the fact that neither of our empirical approaches indicates worse outcomes suggests that any adverse effects were small.
The results of our analysis leave open the broader question of what caused the subprime crisis. Several existing studies have pointed toward a myriad contributing factors, including the expansion of mortgage availability (Mian & Sufi, 2009 ), securitization (Keys et al., 2010; Purnanandam, 2011) , real estate investors (Haughwout et al., 2011) , junior liens (Lee, Mayer, & Tracy, 2012) , monetary policy (Dokko et al. 2011) , and a ''race to the bottom'' caused by too-bigto-fail and other regulatory distortions (Acharya et al. 2011) . Determining which of these, or other factors, played important roles is well beyond the scope of this paper and is left to future research. However, it is clear from the results of our analysis that neither the Community Reinvestment Act nor the affordable housing goals of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac played an important role in precipitating the subprime crisis. 
